Uitspraak
1.[Claimant 1],
[Claimant 2],
[Claimant 3],
[Claimant 4],
[Claimant 5],
[Claimant 6],
[Claimant 7],
[Claimant 8],
[Claimant 9],
[Claimant 10],
Stichting[= foundation]
STICHTING MOTHERS OF SREBRENICA,
1.THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS, Ministry of General Affairs,
de Stichting’[= the Foundation]. Respondents are referred to as ‘the State’ and ‘the UN’.
1.Course of the proceedings
- the Summons of June 4th 2007 with accompanying Exhibits
- the Letter of September 17th 2007 from the State to the District Court with the Letter of August 17th 2007 from the UN to the Permanent Representative of The Netherlands at the UN
- the Letter of September 20th 2007 from Claimants to the District Court
- the Official Conclusion of the
- the UN which did not appear was granted default of appearance on November 7th 2007
- the Procedural Documents in the Procedural Issues the State raised on December 12th 2007 to seek
- the Judgment of this District Court of July 10th 2008 in which the District Court stated it was not competent to take cognizance of the claim against the UN and in which it established that a decision in the Procedural Issue for Intervention alternatively Joinder may be omitted
- the Procedural Documents in the proceedings pending on Appeal at The Hague Appeals Court against the Judgment of July 10th 2008
- the Judgment of The Hague Appeals Court of March 30th 2010 in which briefly stated the Appeals Court upheld the Judgment of July 10th 2008
- the Procedural Documents in the Proceedings Pending in Cassation by Claimants at the Supreme Court against the Judgment of The Hague Appeals Court of March 30th 2010
- the Judgment of the Supreme Court of April 13th 2012 that dismissed the Appeal in Cassation
- the Deed of Depot of May 30th 2012 concerning the deposit of the following documents at the court registry of this District Court by Houtzagers LL.M.:
Nederlands Instituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie[= Dutch Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies] (hereinafter: NIOD),
Srebrenica. Een ‘veilig’ gebied. Reconstructie, achtergronden, gevolgen en analyses van the fall of een Safe Area[= Srebrenica. A ‘safe’ area. Reconstruction, background, consequences and analyses of the fall of a Safe Area] (Parts I up to and including III), Amsterdam, Boom 2002 (hereinafter: NIOD Report),
Parlementaire enquête Srebrenica Missie zonder Vrede[= Parliamentary committee of inquiry on Srebrenica Mission without Peace] Final Report presented to the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament on January 27th 2003 (
Kamerstukken[= Parliamentary papers] II 2002/03, 28506, Nos. 2 to 3) and
Parlementaire enquête Srebrenica, Missie zonder Vrede, [Parliamentary committee of inquiry Srebrenica, Mission without Peace] hearings (Kamerstukken II 2002/2003, 28506, no 5);
- Answer with Exhibits
- Reply with Exhibits
- Rejoinder with Exhibits
- Claimants’ Petition for Oral Pleadings of October 8th 2013
- Cause List Decision of November 13th 2013 allowing the Petition for Pleadings
- Memoranda of Oral Pleadings handed over by both Parties on April 7th 2014 and the Official Record drawn up of said Pleadings.
2.The facts of the case
United Nations Protection Force(hereinafter to be referred to as: UNPROFOR) with its headquarters in Sarajevo. As of April 1st 1995 UNPROFOR was renamed the
United Nations Peace Forces(hereinafter to be referred to as: UNPF).
Armija Bosna I Herzegovina(hereinafter to be referred to as: ABiH)) and the Bosnian-Serb Army (hereinafter to be referred to as: BSA) or
Vojska Republijke Srpske(hereinafter to be referred to as: VRS).
jihadisand Serbian militias and later between ABiH and VRS. This led to the establishment of Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina one of which was Srebrenica. To start with in January 1993 the enclave of Srebrenica first under
jihadicontrol and later that of the ABiH comprised an area of 900 square kilometres skirting the town but in March 1993 after fighting with the Bosnian Serbs this was reduced to an area of just 150 square kilometres.
Medicins Sans Frontières(hereinafter to be referred to as: MSF), visited Srebrenica that was then under siege and overpopulated and where vital necessities were almost non-existent. On March 14th 1993 Morillon addressed a crowd of Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and promised them that they were under the protection of the UN and that he would not abandon them.
Agreement on the status of the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina(known also as the
Status of Forces Agreementhereinafter to be referred to as: SOFA).
inter aliathe following:
inter alia:
safe areasit cited. The Dutch Minister of Defence repeated the offer to the Secretary-General of the UN on September 7th 1993 who accepted it on October 21st 1993. On November 12th 1993 the government of The Netherlands approved posting Dutchbat abroad.
safe areaabout five kilometres from the town of Srebrenica where a company of Dutchbat was encamped in addition to which it manned a number of observation posts (hereinafter to be referred to as: OPs).
Rules of Engagement, the
Standing Operating Procedures(hereinafter referred to as: SOP) and the
Policy Directives as set up by the Force Commander. The Ministry of Defence set down these rules of engagement and instructions, as well as a number of already existing rules and rules specially set up for this particular mission in the Dutch Standing Order 1 (NL) VN Infbat.
- i) The UN Secretary-General was Boutros Boutros-Ghali (hereinafter to be referred to as: the Secretary-General of the VN)
- ii) The Special UN envoy for Bosnia-Herzegovina was Yasushi Akashi (hereinafter to be referred to as: Akashi)
- iii)
- iv) Chief of staff was the Dutch Brigadier General A.M.W.W.M. Kolsteren (hereinafter to be referred to as: Kolsteren)
- v) Head of operations was the Dutch Colonel J.H. De Jonge (hereinafter to be referred to as: De Jonge);
- vi) Commander was the English Lieutenant General Sir R.A. Smith (hereinafter to be referred to as: Smith)
- vii) Deputy Commander was the French General H. Gobilliard (hereinafter to be referred to as: Gobilliard)
- viii) Chief of staff was the Dutch Brigadier General C.H. Nicolai (hereinafter to be referred to as: Nicolai)
- ix) Assistant Chief of staff was the Dutch Lieutenant Colonel J.A.C. de Ruiter (hereinafter to be referred to as: De Ruiter)
- xii) Battalion Commander was the Dutch Lieutenant Colonel T.J.P. Karremans (hereinafter to be referred to as: Karremans)
- xiii) Deputy Battalion Commander was the Dutch Major R.A. Franken (hereinafter to be referred to as: Franken)
- xiv) Minister of Defence was J.J.C. Voorhoeve (hereinafter to be referred to as: Voorhoeve)
- xv) Chief of the Defence Staff was Lieutenant General H.G.B. van den Breemen (hereinafter to be referred to as: Van den Breemen)
- xvi) Deputy Commander of the
safe areawent by convoy through largely Bosnian Serb territory. As of mid 1994 the Bosnian Serbs refused to sanction convoys travelling to the
safe areameaning not all the humanitarian help and food intended for the populace living in the
safe areaarrived at its destination. Moreover the provisioning of Dutchbat suffered because of this.
Post Airstrike Guidancethat where relevant here read as follows:
safe area. Once the Bosnian Serbs had approached the town of Srebrenica they expanded the aim of their attack to taking the town of Srebrenica.
safe areaABiH submitted various requests to Dutchbat to once again have at their disposal the weapons that had been handed in under the demilitarisation agreements but Dutchbat denied all such requests.
safe areaa so-called
‘air presence’. UNPF Zagreb took no decision on a request for close air support submitted later that same day.
blocking positionsto throw up a barrier in the face of the advancing Bosnian Serbs. The order drawn up by De Ruiter in the Dutch language and signed by Nicolai that the oral command given earlier that evening confirms reads as follows:
blocking positionsbut gave them up again later that same day.
blocking positionto the south of the compound that they abandoned a few hours later.
mini safe areawas set up there consisting of the compound and the area of Potočari that lay close by with factory premises and a bus depot.
mini safe area. About 5,000 of them were housed in the compound.
safe areadid not flee to the
mini safe area with factorybut to the woods in the vicinity of the town of Srebrenica (hereinafter to be referred to as: the woods). About 6,000 of these men fell into Bosnian Serb hands.
mini safe areaand in the morning of July 12th 1995 for a third time.
mini safe area.At about 14:00 hours the evacuation of the refugees from the
mini safe areabegan. The Bosnian Serbs who had announced they would be screening able-bodied men for war crimes pulled out men from the rows of refugees who were heading towards the buses. In the afternoon of July 12th 1995 the Bosnian Serbs began to carry off the men in separate buses. After the evacuation of the refugees had been stopped in the evening of July 12th 1995 it was resumed in the morning of July 13th 1995. At the end of the afternoon the last of the refugees remaining in the compound were carried off.
safe areamost of them in mass executions in the period from 14th up to and including 17th July 1995.
mini safe areathat lay outside the compound. On July 13th 1995 she and her son became separated. She has not seen him again since.
mini safe areathat lay outside the compound
.
mini safe areaalong with her daughter where they were not allowed into the compound. [Claimant 3] lost both her husband and her sons.
mini safe areathat lay outside the compound. On July 13th 1995 she became separated from her husband and she never saw him again. In 2003 positive identification of the body of one of her sons did take place.
mini safe area. They were refused entry to the compound. On July 13th 1995 she became separated from her husband. The body of her husband was found in a mass grave. She knows nothing of the fate of her son.
mini safe area. She made no attempt to enter the compound, as she had heard that no more refugees were being allowed in. Her two sons fled into the woods. The mortal remains of her eldest son were found thereafter; she never saw her other son again.
mini safe areawhere she was allowed to enter the compound.
mini safe areawhere they learnt that no one else could enter the compound. On July 13th1995 [Claimant 8] became separated from her husband after which time she never saw him again.
mini safe area. [son of Claimant 9] was allowed to enter the compound, though she herself and her husband were not. On July 12th 1995 her son [son of Claimant 9] was carried off from the compound. To this day he has not been found. On July 13th 1995 [Claimant 9] became separated from her husband. His mortal remains were found in 2004.
mini safe areawhere they were not allowed into the compound. They sought refuge in the part of the
mini safe areathat lay outside the compound. The Bosnian Serbs raped [Claimant 10]’s mother and she died in 1996.
Stichting[= Foundation] is a legal person under Dutch law with full legal capacity whose object in sum is to promote the interests of approximately 6,000 surviving relatives of the victims of the fall of Srebrenica.
3.The dispute
vis-à-vis[Claimant 1] et al and the persons whose interests the Stichting promotes the State has fallen short of fulfilling the obligations with which it is charged
vis-à-vis[Claimant 1] et al and the persons the Stichting promotes the State has acted unlawfully
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocideof December 9th 1948 (hereinafter to be referred to as: the Genocide Convention)
mini safe area
safe area.
safe areaagainst this in particular that Dutchbat:
blocking positionstoo easily and too readily.
safe areamay derive rights to contradict and to dispute the conduct to which Claimants’ accusations are related may be attributed to it. Alternatively should they decide to appeal directly to this the State disputes Claimants’ argument that a violation of standards occurred.
4.The judgment
Intent
Part 1with a number of general considerations and follows in
Part IIwith the judgment of Claimants’ demands where these are based on failure attributable to the State. In
Part IIIthe District Court discusses the claims based on the State acting unlawfully due to violation of international and/or national law. In addition we deal with the demands Claimants have made based on violation of the Genocide Convention. In Part III under 1 the District Court handles the question as to whether the conduct to which Claimants’ accusations refer may be attributed to the State. The District Court answers the question affirmatively as regards a number of instances concerning conduct and under 2 goes on to examine the lawfulness of said instances.
Part IVof the judgment contains the conclusion. We have added a table of contents for this chapter that takes the form of an appendix to the judgment.
intelligencegathering. According to Claimants these arguments do not contain any substantive accusation but “this is about the State not being able to advance the circumstances as being in any way exculpatory since Claimants can show after all that preparations and the equipping of Dutchbat were an integral part of the State’s responsibility and that the State acted irresponsibly in that regard or at least took the wrong decisions.” In accordance with Claimants’ intentions the District Court is not going to handle as being in any way substantive the accusation concerning the decision-making process and/or the preparations for the mission.
Stichtingthat is asking for a declaratory judgment. We do not dispute that the
Stichtingis a legal person under Section 3:305a of
Burgerlijk Wetboek(BW) [= Dutch Civil Code] authorised to bring just such an action though not an action for damages.
Stichtingin subsequent proceedings the District Court understands the declaratory judgment applied for concerning the unlawful actions of the State as relating to qualifying said actions as unlawful acts in the sense applicable under international and/or national law. That then means in order to allow the action all of the criteria for an unlawful act must be met.
Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35, The fall of Srebrenicaof November 15th 1999), (ii) the NIOD [= Dutch Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies], (iii) the French Parliamentary committee of inquiry (
Rapport d’information commune sur les événements de Srebrenicaof November 22nd 2001), and (iv) the Dutch Parliamentary committee of inquiry and the statements made in the context of the Dutch Parliamentary committee of inquiry and the provisional examination of witnesses in the cases of Nuhanović and Mustafić
versusthe State of The Netherlands (hereinafter to be referred to as: Nuhanović and Mustafić cases). These papers form part of the case file. Parties are not unanimous in endorsing the conclusions drawn in the aforementioned reports. Unless otherwise mentioned below therefore the District Court has not included them when forming its judgment. Following on from Parties the District Court did however, based in part upon the judicial finding of fact from the aforementioned reports and on the statements brought into the case.
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,hereinafter: ICTY) of August 2nd 2001 (in the first instance) and April 19th 2004 (on appeal) in the Krstić case, the pronouncement of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter to be referred to as: ICJ) of February 26th 2007 in the case between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro and finally the judgments in the Nuhanović and Mustafić cases of the Supreme Court and the Appeals Court at The Hague (namely: HR September 6th 2013, ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9225 and ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BZ9228, and The Hague Appeals Court July 5th 2011, ECL:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR0133 and ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR0132). The District Court takes into account the established offences and where they are related to the fall of Srebrenica makes the judgments given in these cases its own. Unless otherwise mentioned, the follow-up passages the ICTY quotes in the Krstić case always refer to passages from the judgment in the first instance made on August 2nd 2001 that remained undisputed on appeal and/or were upheld.
safe area. Besides this the case is specifically about the family members of [Claimant 1] et al. The body of facts in this case is more wide-ranging than in the Nuhanović and Mustafić cases. Moreover it is not limited to the actions of Dutchbat but also relates to the actions of the government of The Netherlands e.g. in relation to the decision-making process surrounding the provision of close air support to Dutchbat. This does not alter the fact that the judgments given in these two cases are of significance to the current case, as this takes place in the same context as the fall of Srebrenica.
Appeals Chamberof the ICTY deliberated as follows:
safe areaand who left it around the time when the fall of Srebrenica took place on July 11th 1995. In doing so the District Court makes no judgment as to whether they are refugees in the sense in which that is understood by the Geneva Convention on Refugees.
safe areacame about. The District Court always refers to ‘the
safe area’ as indicating the town of Srebrenica and its environs that formed the safe area as indicated in the mandate. The town the District Court denotes is always ‘the town of Srebrenica’. ‘The fall of Srebrenica’ refers specifically to the fall of the town of Srebrenica on July 11th 1995 that heralded the end of the UN mission. ‘The
mini safe area’is aimed at the compound and the nearby area where from July 11th up to and including July 13th refugees were staying. The District Court uses ‘Potočari’ for the area around the
mini safe areawhere the houses were located to which the Bosnian Serbs brought the male refugees who they had selected from the
mini safe area.
Rules of Engagement, their accompanying explanation, the records of talks concerning what was discussed around the time of the fall of Srebrenica in the bunker of the
Defensie Crisisbeheersingscentrum(hereinafter to be referred to as: DCBC) [= Defence Crisis Control Centre] and Dutchbat’s debriefing reports. Claimants argue that by not bringing said documents into the case the State has failed to comply with the instruction contained in Section 21 of the
Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering(Rv) [= Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure].
Wet Openbaarheid van Bestuur(hereinafter: WOB) [= Government Information (Public Access) Act] Claimants have petitioned the Minister of Defence to publish the
Rules of Engagementof the UN and their explanation, UNPROFOR’s SOP and the
Force Commander Directivesfrom UNPROFOR’s Commander in Chief. Claimants have mounted a legal challenge to the refusal of the Minister of Defence to publish these papers and this has been upheld right up to the court of last resort. From the judgment of the Administrative Disputes Division of the Council of State of March 3rd 2010 it appears that it was deliberated upon in sum that the Minister of Defence must respect the judgment of the UN about these documents and the High Contracting Parties at the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN. The UN has made provision to the effect that these documents are to remain confidential and are thus not intended for publication (ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BL6245). This judgment is an obstacle to Claimants’ conclusion that the State wrongly failed to bring into the case the
Rules of Engagementand their accompanying explanation.
safe areais attributable to the State. According to Claimants said obligations arise from the agreement between the State and the UN to put at its disposal troops to protect the populace in the
safe areaand this is to be deemed as a third-party clause in the sense of Section 6:253 BW. They argue that the populace accepted this clause thereby becoming a party to said agreement.
safe areato demand protection from the State or to appeal in any other way to the State agreement as referred to in Section 6:253 BW. It is also not feasible that the State together with the UN has agreed a third-party clause to the benefit of the Claimants as this would be at odds with an international law argument attributing liability for actions of troops in the context of UN missions. After all Claimants’ appeal to the agreement between the State and the UN with the third-party clause for which they argue in fact comes down to directly forcing the State to observe Resolution 836 and implies that the populace of a country or a place under a UN resolution where the UN acts with the help of military forces claims to observation of the resolution can be made at all times against a sending state supplying the military forces for the implementation of the resolution.
1.Attributing the unlawful acts of which it is accused to the State
seriatimthe following points:
effective control
command and controlover Dutchbat to the UN
Effective controlof Dutchbat’s actions in general
effective controlof the State over Dutchbat’s actions in the period prior to the fall of Srebrenica
Effective controlby the State over Dutchbat’s actions after the fall of Srebrenica
Effective controlby the State over Dutchbat’s specific actions after the fall of Srebrenica and
effective controlover Dutchbat’s actions after the fall of Srebrenica.
effective controlover said actions. The Supreme Court derives this criterion from Section 7 of the
Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organisations(hereinafter to be referred to as: DARIO) that the
International Law Organisation(ILO) has drawn up. In the cases referred to the Appeals Court considered that though this provision of
effective controlis only mentioned in relation to attribution to the UN the same criterion holds when answering the question whether actions of troops must be attributed to the state that placed them at the disposal of others. The Supreme Court considered that the ILO’s DARIO recommendations and the
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts(hereinafter to be referred to as: DARS) may generally be accepted as a reflection of current, unwritten international law and were apparently accepted as such even in 1995.
‘factual control’of the State over Dutchbat’s specific actions. Whether or not this is a point of discussion must be assessed in terms of the circumstances surrounding the case. When doing so it should be remembered that under Clause 48 DARIO the same act and/or acts might be attributed to both the State and the UN under what is called
‘dual attribution’.
command and controlof Dutchbat to the UN.
command and controlof Dutchbat to the UN. This was not recorded in any written agreement as frequently does occur in a so-called
‘transfer of authority’. Nor is that necessary since in order for the transfer of
command and controlto take place no procedural requirements have to be observed. After the agreement referred to under 2.14 in which the State put troops at the disposal of the UN Dutchbat was indeed placed under UN orders and operated as a contingent of UNPROFOR.
command and controlover Dutchbat took place for the purpose of a UN peacekeeping operation based on Chapter VII of the UN Charter to implement the mandate (see 2.12). The Security Council is solely responsible for implementing international peace and security and is primarily responsible for implementing the mandate. The
command and controlthe State transferred to the UN is
inter aliacited and described in the Operations order of December 14th 1994 that aims at Dutchbat III replacing Dutchbat II. The substance of said order is
inter aliaas follows:
(2) Upon arrival in YU[District Court’s addition: Yugoslavia]
Dutchbat is oob [NAVO: operational control(1) (opcon)] of UNPROFOR”.
Operational controlwe read as follows:
OPCON. The authority delegated to direct forces assigned to the commander limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of these units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. [Dutch: onder operationeel bevel (oob)]”[under operational orders]
.
When The Netherlands puts its troops at the disposal of an international organisation in the form of a peacekeeping operation it transfers operational orders over its troops to that organisation or coalition of countries. In this case therefore Dutch troops were placed under United Nations’ orders and their own commanders Lieutenant Colonel Karremans and the other commanding officers of Dutchbat reported to the North-East Sector of Unprofor in Tuzla and in Sarajevo. (…) The next successive level is General Janvier in Zagreb and on the civilian side Mr Akashi the special representative of the United Nations.”(Proceedings TK 1994/95, p. 5987).
command and controlover Dutchbat to the UN was due only to a lack of knowledge.
command and controlover Dutchbat to the UN. Given the substance of the operation order the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the operational implementation of the mandate and what is usual in peacekeeping operations that the UN carries out included in the
command and controlthe State transferred to the UN the say over Dutchbat’s operational implementation of the mandate. In this regard the UN chain of command at UNPROFOR directed Dutchbat in this giving orders and instructions to the commander of Dutchbat. During implementation of the UN mission therefore the State had no formal competence
vis-à-visDutchbat’s operational implementation of the mandate and was thus not competent to exercise its say about Dutchbat whether via the Dutch officers in the UN chain of command or directly.
command and controlstates supplying troops at all times retain the right to withdraw them and to cease taking part in the operation (
‘full command’).As usual during a transfer of
command and controlover the operational implementation of the mandate to the UN the State retained further say about personal matters of the military personnel put at the disposal of the UN who remained in service of the State and Dutchbat’s material logistics. The State also retained the authority to punish said military personnel by disciplining them and subjecting them to criminal law. Finally the State had a say over the preparations for the mission e.g. in selecting and training the troops. Nor is any of this disputed as between parties.
command and controlover Dutchbat’s operational implementation of the mandate was a normal situation in which a state puts its troops at the disposal of others during a peacekeeping operation working under the orders of the UN and that is described in a report of the Secretary-General of the UN of 1994 as follows:
In general, United Nations command is not a full command and closer in meaning to the generally recognized concept of “operational command”. It involves the full authority to issue operational directives within the limits of (1) a specific mandate of the Security Council; (2) an agreed period of time, with the stipulation that an earlier withdrawal requires adequate prior notification; and (3) a specific geographical range (the mission area as a whole).”(UN Doc. A/49/681 of November 21st 1994, paragraph 6).
effective controlover said actions on the part of Dutchbat.
dual attributionavailable we do not need to examine whether the UN also had
effective controlover Dutchbat’s actions that form part of the accusations.
effective controlthere would be no requirement for the State in giving instructions to Dutchbat to have broken the structure of the chain of command at the UN or exercised independent operational authority to give orders. It comes down to the actual say over specific actions whereby all of the actual circumstances and the particular context of the case must be examined. In the Nuhanović and Mustafić cases the Appeals Court considered that there not only is the question significant as to whether the actions constituted implementation of a specific instruction the State had given but also whether in the absence of any such specific instruction the State had it in its powers to prevent the actions concerned. These considerations remained undisputed on cassation.
command and controland that for that reason alone there is room for attributing all of Dutchbat’s actions to the State. The quotation concerned is as follows:
The Minister of Defence, Voorhoeve, adopted the following position vis-à-vis NIOD namely that the regulation surrounding Command and Control in The Netherlands and the question as to where everyone’s responsibility lay was more or less clear but that in practice it did not appear to be possible to separate these kinds of matters meaning they got mixed up together. According to him in a strict international law sense it was possible to argue that once The Netherlands had put units at the disposal of the UN the only right it still had was to withdraw its units but that everything else was up to the UN. The Hague would say about this: these military personnel are now UN blue helmets so this is no longer our problem. In practice however things were not like that, argued Voorhoeve.”(NIOD, p. 2283)
.
command and controlover the operational implementation of the mandate to the UN is not decisive and leaves open the possibility that the State exercises
effective controlover Dutchbat’s actions.
command and controlmeaning The Hague exercised continuous influence by passing formal lines and responsibilities.
per sethat the State exercised
effective control. Dutch officers worked in the UN chain of command whence operational implementation of the mandate was directed. It is usual for military personnel from countries that supply troops form part of the UN chain of command for UN peacekeeping operations.
per seaccompanied by
effective controlof the State. Such direct contact was according to statements Nicolai made to the Parliamentary committee of inquiry prompted by the practical wish to discuss questions directly (PE hearings [= PCI interviews], p. 259). This contact did take place
inter aliaduring the discussion about abandoning the observation posts between Nicolai and Karremans prior to issuing the
Post Airstrike Guidancethat we will discuss below and that took place within the UN chain of command.
effective control. Claimants argue that the influence of The Hague expressed itself
inter aliain frequent requests for information. The State correctly points out that requests for information by the Dutch Government do not constitute exercise of
effective control. In addition Nicolai’s sigh that Claimants advanced contained in the NIOD Report namely, “
I phoned The Hague at one point and was pissed off when the people in The Hague started asking where the forward Air Controllers were. You can’t get more crazy than them wanting to know that in The Hague.”(p. 2626) the District Court understands this as apparently detailed requests for information. Other than Claimants argue these requests do not
per sedemonstrate any control being exercised by the Dutch Government over Dutch officers and/or Dutchbat during operational implementation of the mandate. Given the responsibility that the State had even after the transfer of
command and controlover the operational implementation of the mandate
vis-à-visDutchbat (see: 4.41) contact between the Dutch Government and the Dutch officers at UNPROFOR would seem obvious.
effective controlunless in that regard we can talk of there having been orders or instructions to said Dutch officers or some other form of operational guidance by the State.
effective control. Claimants argue with reference to page 2276 of the NIOD Report that the DCBC in this period concerned itself more with operational matters. On this page under the heading “
verhoudingen tussen DCBC en KL Crisisstaf”[= “relations between DCBC and KL Crisis Staff] the relations between these two units are described
inter aliaas follows:
effective control; even leaving aside the fact that this concern can consist of heightened interest and need for information here above all as the State has sufficiently explained we are dealing with the relationship and division of tasks between two organisational units within The Netherlands.
effective controlbeing exercised by the State “since military personnel hardly ever act on their own initiative”. Quite apart from the question whether the latter remark is true or is true in all circumstances these generalisations on the part of Claimants provide insufficient basis to be able to conclude that such actions were always preceded by instructions from the State.
inter aliainadequate training and preparation of Dutchbat in order to excuse itself for the accusations made against it Claimants do indeed lay a basis for attributing Dutchbat’s actions to the State namely Dutchbat acting
ultra viresover and against UN instructions. As to this the District Court deliberates as follows.
command and controlover operational implementation of the mandate is transferred to the UN and said military force then goes on to act beyond the authority given it by the UN or on its own initiative acts against the instructions of the UN as Claimants point out said military force acts
ultra vires[= beyond its legal power or authority]. Such action is attributable to the State supplying the troops because the State has a say over the mechanisms underlying said
ultra viresactions, selection, training and the preparations for the mission of the troops placed at the disposal of the UN. Moreover the State supplying the troops has it in its powers to take measures to counter
ultra viresactions on the part of its troops given the fact that it has a say about personal matters and disciplinary punishments.
ultra viresactions to the State supplying the troops there is no requirement for said state to give any instruction or order relating to
ultra viresaction or that this specifically influences the case in some other way. What is decisive is that the State delivering the troops retains the powers it has after transfer of
command and controlto the UN as well as the relevant say in respect of and with it
effective controlover self-willed powers acting beyond the powers the UN has granted or against the instructions of the UN concerning the actions of troops put at the UN’s disposal. In this regard the District Court points to the explanation of the ILO at Clause 7 DARIO in which
inter aliathe following is recorded:
Practice relating to peacekeeping forces is particularly significant in the present context because of the control that the contributing State retains over disciplinary and criminal matters. This may have consequences with regard to attribution of conduct. (…) Attribution of conduct to the contributing State is clearly linked with the retention of some powers by that State over its national contingent and thus on the control that the State possesses in the relevant respect.” (See under 7, p. 21).
ultra viresaction on the part of troops placed at its disposal must exclusively be attributed to it unless
“gross negligence or wilful misconduct”occurs (see UN Doc A 50/995 of July 9th 1996 and UN Doc A 46/185 of 23 May 1991) alters nothing as far as the aforesaid is concerned. The fact of the matter is that this opinion of the UB is not decisive for attributing the actions of troops in the framework of peacekeeping operations according to the relevant valid norms.
ultra viresactions on the part of troops may be attributed (
dual attribution) to both the sending state and the UN or that it is only appropriate to attribute such actions to the sending state as is argued in the literature.
ultra viresactions on Dutchbat’s part (ii).
During the coming weeks we have to give the highest priority to the safety of the Dutch military personnel. This is why the commanders are charged in the first place with avoiding casualties. I want to see all of those men and women come back home in one piece. (…) For this reason during the past few days we telephoned all the commanders and spoke with them. We do not wish to take any risks with Dutch personnel or defend any indefensible positions. Be wise and bring all of our boys and girls back home in one piece.”
blocking positionswas taken on July 9th 1995 in Zagreb and was passed on that day to Dutchbat and to the Dutch Government. To the Parliamentary committee of inquiry Voorhoeve stated as follows:
Whilst we were discussing the blocking positions I expressed the hope that the commanders would take such measures as to ensure as few casualties as possible would fall.”(PE hearings, p. 625).
blocking positionsVan den Breemen writes as follows:
The Minister too had considerable doubts and worries but agreed with me. In the end the commanders have to decide with the note in the margin to the effect that the political wish remained intact namely that unnecessary casualties must be avoided. If I remember correctly this was then briefly communicated to the UN. In the afternoon Nicolai phoned me to report an update of the latest state of affairs. I cannot remember precisely what I said in any case nothing important such as don’t lose your bottle and all the best and don’t forget: no unnecessary casualties.”(PE hearings, p. 735).
blocking positionsas decided on July 9th 1995 no unnecessary casualties should be caused. There is no point of departure to be able to assess whether the instruction was given any earlier than July 9th 1995 or that it had any broader import than actions at the
blocking positionsor that it had some other, namely “
greener” –i.e. more military character and was more risky than the
“blue”actions in the context of the peacekeeping operation – as far as concerns the implementation of the mandate.
effective controlby the State over the actions of Dutchbat. After all the State interfered in an operational matter for which moreover UNPROFOR had given a specific order and this was after the State had transferred
command and controlover the operational implementation of the mandate by Dutchbat to the UN and the say over this operational matter was reserved to the UN. This is not altered by the fact that the instruction matches up with the immediately preceding general instruction of the UN expressed in the
Post Airstrike Guidanceof May 29th 1995, “
that the execution of the mandate is secondary to the security of UN personnel. The intention being to avoid loss of life defending positions for their own sake and unnecessary vulnerability to hostage taking.”(See 2.20). What is decisive here is that the State in giving Dutchbat this instruction interfered with the management of the operational implementation of the mandate by Dutchbat that it had already transferred to the UN.
ultra viresacts on the part of Dutchbat in respect of the mandate (1) and when abandoning the observation posts (2).
safe areaDutchbat acted contrary to the mandate. The State correctly points out that the resolutions and the mandate ascribe powers to Dutchbat. During operational implementation of the mandate Dutchbat acted under
command and controlof UNPROFOR. If it did act independently and beyond the powers given in the mandate the District Court is of the opinion that
ultra viresacts on the part of Dutchbat may be attributed to the State.
safe areahowever is not related to independently exceeding the powers given in the operational implementation of the mandate by Dutchbat and thus to
ultra viresacts under
command and controlof the UN. There are no grounds for attributing to the State Dutchbat’s acts for implementation of and within the framework of the mandate.
Post Airstrike Guidanceof May 29th 1995 were met. According to Claimants only isolated positions in areas taken by Bosnian Serbs were allowed to be abandoned when lives were at risk or there were dead to be mourned over.
standing orderto set light to everything when forced to abandon an observation post Dutchbat did not set light to observation post OP-E (p. 2005). The District Court leaves this remark without discussion in the light of the fact that it bears no relation to the heart of Claimants’ accusation namely that Dutchbat abandoned the observation posts without offering any resistance and in doing so failed to provide Srebrenica with sufficient defence.
Post Airstrike Guidanceof May 29th 1995 (NIOD, pp.1991 to 1996).
Post Airstrike Guidanceshould be viewed neither as being separate from the context we gave above nor as being separate from the rest of the
Post Airstrike Guidance. This begins with the report of the Serbian reaction at the end of May 1995 to the close air support [= CAS] given and the UN instruction namely:
Post Airstrike Guidancementions targets for UNPROFOR actions in the coming period
inter alia:
“
Positions that can be reinforced, or it is practical to counter attack to recover, are not to be abandoned. Positions that are isolated in BSA territory and unable to be supported may be abandoned at the Superior Commander’s discretion when they are threatened and in his judgement life or lives have or will be lost. (…)”
Post Airstrike Guidanceespecially if in doing so we take into account the context and the additional substance of the
Post Airstrike Guidance.
Rules of Engagementand other UN instructions may be of no avail to them in this regard. These instructions grant powers to use force and regulate the use of such powers but do not oblige its use in any way. That an instruction could have been carried out in some other way does not mean without further ado that actions have been carried out contrary to the instruction. That holds also for the possibility that others would have acted differently – as Claimants suggest in Janvier’s explanation to the French Parliamentary committee of inquiry when he was talking in general terms about Dutchbat’s actions in this regard where
inter aliahe said:
ultra viresby abandoning observation posts prior to the fall of Srebrenica – that may not therefore be attributed to the State.
ultra vireswhen abandoning the
blocking positionsas Claimants argue.
effective controlthe State had with the exception of actions surrounding the
blocking positionsDutchbat’s actions prior to the fall of Srebrenica are not attributable to the State. This concerns the following:
- i) Claimants’ accusation that Dutchbat did too little to arrange for convoys with food and humanitarian help reaching the
- ii) Claimants’ accusation that Dutchbat did too little to block the advance of the Bosnian Serbs and to protect the populace in the
blocking positionswere lawful or unlawful.
mini safe area. As to this the District Court deliberates as follows.
inter aliaVoorhoeve, Van Baal and Van den Breemen. After that Van Baal and Van den Breemen travelled to Sarajevo to speak with Janvier. They had received the instruction from Voorhoeve to conduct the talk with Janvier in the context of the meeting held that same morning. Van Baal had stated before the Parliamentary committee of inquiry the following:
We agreed amongst ourselves that we would stick to the position that the implementation of the task should be directed towards protecting the populace and that we should do so for as long as possible in addition taking into account that fighting at that point was not or was hardly worthwhile. Allowing casualties to fall unnecessarily would then no longer be a point of discussion. The third point was that we had to take into account that we could find ourselves in a situation in which Dutchbat would have to evacuate along with the populace to MKF territory[District Court’s addition: Muslim Croat Federation]
. Those were the conclusions of the meeting that we took to general Janvier in Zagreb. That is the basis on which we conducted talks with him.”(PE hearings, p. 344).
safe areahad failed. The talks that Van Baal and Van den Breemen conducted that evening with Janvier were about the situation that had come about after the fall of Srebrenica. In Van Baal’s own words in his statement about the talks with Janvier to the Parliamentary committee of inquiry:
The accent then shifted in fact from UNPROFOR’s military operation to the problem of the refugees.”and:
We said: Dutchbat and the populace will evacuate together or after each other. That was agreed as such with General Janvier. (…)”(PE hearings, pp. 344 to 345).
mini safe area.In doing so the Government of The Netherlands took part in this decision-making process at the highest level. This decision was accompanied by a transitional period in which matters in Potočari were settled.
Later that day I went to Zagreb shortly after noon. I arrived there sometime in the afternoon. Talks with General Janvier began about one hour after we had arrived. The talks took place with a number of interruptions and went on till late in the evening our last contact being after ten o’clock.”
mini safe areaduring the transitional period. This too was discussed in contacts between Voorhoeve and Nicolai on July 11th 1995. Nicolai made the following statement about this to the Parliamentary committee of inquiry:
After I had informed the Minister about the fact that the airstrikes had been brought to an end he asked me whether I knew of Dutchbat’s extraction plan. I answered: “Yes” (…) I informed him that after lengthy consultations that in fact lasted only briefly we saw no other solution in Sarajevo than to evacuate the populace who were completely unprotected and present there under wretched circumstances; we had no means of doing anything about it. From the point of view of security or guaranteeing security of the refugees we saw no other option than to include in the evacuation Dutchbat and any other UN means required since we did not wish to leave it to the Serbs. He agreed with this at once.”(PE hearings, p. 271).
(…) The second consideration that was discussed directly and prominently – Mr Nicolai emphasised this – was that the blue helmets were needed to care for the refugees. We agreed about this at once. (…).”(PE hearings, p. 626).
effective controlover providing humanitarian assistance to and preparation of Dutchbat’s evacuation of the refugees in the
mini safe area. This action therefore on the part of Dutchbat may be attributed to the State. Such
effective controlwas limited to this and did not spread to Dutchbat’s involvement with the stream of refugees that prior to commencement of the transitional period moved during the course of the afternoon from the town of Srebrenica to the
mini safe area. Such
effective controlwas also not related to refugees outside the
mini safe areaor to Dutchbat’s actions outside the
mini safe areae.g. the abandonment of observation posts after the fall of Srebrenica.
effective controlby the State over Dutchbat’s actions during the transitional period continued until Dutchbat withdrew on July 21st1995 after the refugees had been evacuated from the
mini safe area. Resolution 1004 (see 2.42) did not lead to any other actual situation during the transitional period: the Bosnian Serbs did not give heed to the call it contained to discontinue their offensive and to withdraw from the
safe areaforthwith. Nor did it appear that said resolution led to any order to Dutchbat to take positions in and around Srebrenica or in any other way to attempt to retake Srebrenica by military intervention.
ultra viresaction must be attributed to the State.
mini safe areathat Dutchbat had demarcated and where the refugees were staying when the order was given. On July 11th 1995 Karremans had informed the Bosnian Serbs that he regarded the compound and the surroundings as a
safe area(NIOD, p. 2,604). In this actual situation with due regard for the text of Gobilliard’s order in which the task of protecting the refugees
“in your care”follows on immediately after that of withdrawal of Dutchbat in Potočari we are unable to understand the order as reasonably relating to anything other than just the refugees in the
mini safe area.
effective controlover Dutchbat’s actions during the interim period:
effective controlover Dutchbat not reporting war crimes under the Geneva Conventions oblige us to attribute this to the State but we may leave this without discussion here.
effective controlof the State over Dutchbat’s provision of humanitarian assistance to and preparations for the evacuation of the refugees during the transitional period:
mini safe area(under (i) up to and including (iv) and/or – as established below – Dutchbat’s actions prior to the commencement of the transitional period (under (iii) up to and including (v)). The District Court will now proceed to examine whether the State in some other way had
effective controlover one or more of said actions on the part of Dutchbat and that for that reason may be attributed to the State even at this late stage.
ultra viressince this was contrary to Gobilliard’s order “
Concentrate your forces into the Potocari Camp, including withdrawal of your Ops. Take all reasonable measures to protect refugees and civilians in your care.”
vis-à-visthis order it did act
ultra vires. Not leaving the observation posts immediately after the fall of Srebrenica is thus attributable to the State.
blocking positions“is only the more incomprehensible” when we take into account Gobilliard’s order as follows: “
Giving up any weapons and military equipment is not authorised and is not a point of discussion.”Claimants then go on to point to the total number of weapons missing as referred to on page 2,250 of the NIOD Report i.e. 199 rifles, 25 UZIs, 38 pistols, 18 individual .30 machine guns and 11 individual .50 machine guns. The District Court understands Claimants’ position thus that from the point at which Gobilliard had ordered them not to do so they accuse Dutchbat and with it the State of having handed over weapons and other equipment to the Bosnian Serbs.
mini safe areaDutchbat acting on the orders of the Bosnian Serbs handed over weapons and other equipment as well as vehicles that they were using to accompany the buses filled with refugees. Dutchbat also handed over weapons and other equipment when surrendering the last
blocking position.In conclusion we have now established that the garrisons at the observation posts were doing this too even after the fall of Srebrenica.
ultra viresactions on the part of Dutchbat in respect of Gobilliard’s order and attributable to the State on those grounds.
The journey from Srebrenica to Tuzla”, this has to do with a group of men and members of the 28th Division of the ABiH who travelled from Srebrenica to Tuzla. On July 11th 1995 these men gathered during the course of the day in Susnjari and in the night of July 11th to 12th 1995 left in the direction of Tuzla. In the Krstić case the statement records the following (in legal ground 60):
As the situation in Potočari escalated towards crisis on the evening of 11 July 1995 word spread through the Bosnian Muslim community that the able-bodied men should take to the woods and form a column together with the members of the 28th Division of the ABiH and attempt a breakthrough towards Bosnian Muslim-held territory in the north.”
The majority of Srebrenica’s men of military age did not seek refuge in Potočari. The vast majority of them, including the civilian and military authorities, as well as some of their families, decided instead that they would risk making their way on foot to Tuzla, some 50 km away, through Serb lines and through forested, partly mined territory. They decided that they would fight their way through if they had to. By mid-afternoon, the men who were preparing to make the journey began to gather in the hamlet of Susnjari, located in the north-western portion of the enclave.”(No. 310).
safe areafled to the woods in the vicinity of the town of Srebrenica. A large number of them about 6,000 according to the ICTY (Krstić legal ground 83) fell into Bosnian Serb hands after which they were no longer seen alive. Claimants argue that this flight took place on the advice of Dutchbat and that Dutchbat that knew the men were in danger on July 11th 1995 should have sounded the general alarm and taken action. The State disputes whether any such advice was ever given.
inter aliain [Claimant 5]’s statement as follows:
mini safe areaon July 11th 1995 at 23:00 hours made the following statement about the advice:
mini safe areathis advice could equally have been given prior to the commencement of the transitional period. We are unable however to exclude the fact that the advice dates from Gobilliard’s order. Since that order bore no relation to the refugees beyond the
mini safe areathere is no place for attribution due to
ultra viresactions
vis-à-visthis order.
mini safe areain the evening at about eight o’clock. There is no evidence that [Claimant 10] who does not mention any time of arrival came any later than the other Claimants who arrived at the
mini safe areaprior to the commencement of the transitional period. That means in addition that the advice about which [Claimant 1], [Claimant 4], and [Claimant 10] make statements must have taken place prior to the commencement of the transitional period.
effective controlover the disputed advice to the male refugees to flee into the woods.
ultra viresin respect of this order.
effective controlduring the transitional period that relates to Dutchbat providing humanitarian assistance and preparing the evacuation of the refugees from the
mini safe area. Gobilliard’s order is not aimed at these refugees who were outside the
mini safe area. Moreover there is no evidence that would compel us to accept that the State had
effective controlover said neglect.
effective controlof the State over them in the transitional period.
ultra viresin respect of the order is answered in the negative. Nor is there any evidence of the State’s
effective controlover this action prior to the transitional period.
effective controlover Dutchbat actions in the transitional period. Inasmuch as here we can speak of
ultra viresactions in respect of Gobilliard’s order that is aimed at these refugees it is on that basis moreover attributable to the State.
effective controlholds too for attribution of the other actions of which the State is accused that relate to the decision-making process within the UN and NATO. Here we are talking about the State exercising decisive influence over the supposed unlawful acts of these international organisations. To be able to establish whether said influence did exist we would have to assess all of the actual circumstances and the special context of the case.
effective controlover (a) the absence of close air support (b) stopping close air support (c) the failure of French helicopters to appear and thwarting plans for the recapture of Srebrenica.
effective controlover this. In essence the matter comes down to this: Claimants arguments boil down to the decisions within the UN chain of command about close air support being prompted by the State’s overpowering wish to guarantee Dutchbat’s security including that of about 30 Dutchbatters taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, though according to Claimants they had gone along with the Bosnian Serbs voluntarily and for that reason to avoid every risk. According to Claimants the State had discontinued or had others discontinue various requests for close air support for which there was operational necessity. The State disputes it had
effective controlover deployment of the air force.
close air support, the air force for direct support of UN troops on the ground and not of
air strikes,an air attack with a destructive character. In what follows only the air force in the form of
close air supportforms part of the discussion.
effective controlover the deployment of the air force the District Court argues first and foremost that the State had no formal powers that were in any way connected with the deployment of the air force. The procedure for requesting
close air support,called
Blue Sword,is the sum of two parts: approval by the UN and approval by NATO.
Close Air Support Committeeconsisting of the most important officers and civil officials then assesses the request after which UNPROFOR commandant sends it through to UNPF headquarters in Zagreb. In Zagreb the
Crisis Action Teamunder leadership of the Chief of Staff Kolsteren then considers the request and submits it for signature to the
Force CommanderJanvier who in turn requests permission from the Special Representative for Bosnia-Herzegovina Akashi. All officials weigh up the request based on a checklist of fixed criteria.
Air Operations Coordination Center(AOCC) for contact with
Combined Air Operations Center(CAOC) NATO air force in Vicenza. In Zagreb there was a liaison cell for contact with Vicenza and besides this there was a NATO officer present for contact with the headquarters of the
Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Europe(CINCSOUTH) in Naples the American Admiral Leighton Smith. Though AOCC in Sarajevo had no formal powers it was important in providing information about the specific circumstances under which air strikes had to be carried out. Through the prior warning it gave to NATO decisions could be prepared there and airplanes be made ready. It was nevertheless CINCSOUTH that had to give permission for close air support.
close air supportwere formulated. Of these nine two requests were allowed.
effective controlof the State over the deployment of the air force. To do that we would have to establish that the State had decisive influence over the decision-making process regarding close air support. According to Claimants as of July 8th 1995 this was the case.
Bosnia Herzegovina Commandin Sarajevo where the options regarding the provision of CAS to Dutchbat were discussed. Nicolai then decided not to submit any ‘
pre approved’ request for CAS in case the Bosnian Serbs decided to further press their attack but in the morning of July 9th 1995 to deploy
air presence. The request was not submitted. According to Claimants this course of action on the part of Nicolai can be explained by the fact that Voorhoeve had at that moment already phoned with an instruction from the State that precedence had to be given to the safety of Dutch military personnel. Claimants point to the TV interview that Voorhoeve gave to NOVA on July 10th 1995 cited earlier and argue here that the instruction was apparently given as of July 8th 1995.
blocking positions.From Voorhoeve’s statement in the same interview that the deployment of the air force was “
inevitable” we can further derive that this instruction did not also mean that Dutchbat’s safety had to prevail above that of the CAS. No other facts or circumstances are argued or proven from which it would follow that the State exercised decisive influence over Nicolai’s actions on July 8th 1995.
air presenceand then forbade
forward air controllersto leave the compound. According to Claimants at the basis of these interventions on the part of Karremans lies the same instruction just discussed by Voorhoeve as that which Nicolai is supposed to have received. The deliberation at 4.127 about Voorhoeve’s instruction holds here too. The disputed actions on the part of Karremans therefore provide no proof of the
effective controlof the State.
At 12 noon a discussion was conducted between Zagreb and Nicolai about the positions of The Hague in relation to CAS; it was confirmed that this was available. First however there had to be a request for Close Air Support and that had at that moment not yet reached Zagreb. The paperwork in Sarajevo for a Blue Sword Request had been prepared. The simultaneous judgment of the intelligence staff at Zagreb was that the VRS would not attack. On board the USS Lasalle where NATO Admiral Smith was located there was serious concern about where precisely the VRS were and what the Bosnian Serbs had in mind. There the idea was active that the VRS had come very close.”
effective controlover deployment of the air force on July 10th 1995. Apparently “
Haagse standpunten” [= positions adopted in The Hague] - moreover it is not clear precisely what they contained – were discussed that day within the UN chain of command. As we explained earlier it is not unusual to have an exchange of information and views between the UN and the sending state during a mission such as the one currently being discussed. From the passage cited there appear to be other factors within the UN chain of command that could have influenced the decision-making process about CAS such as the absence of a specific request and the assessment of the intelligence staff at Zagreb.
effective controlof the State follows from the circumstance disputed by the State namely that in the course of July 11th 1995 at around noon of that day within the UN and NATO chain of command approved CAS had been discontinued. In that connection Claimants point to an equally disputed telephone conversation of July 11th 1995 at about 12:30 hours that Van den Breemen with Voorhoeve at his side conducted with Kolsteren. In that conversation Van den Breemen is supposed to have remarked that safety was paramount now that the task threatened to become inoperable (NIOD, p. 2,236). They further point to a passage recorded under number 306 of the UN Report relating to a telephone conversation between Akashi and Voorhoeve in the afternoon of July 11th and where of relevance the following content:
The Special Representative of the Secretary-General recalled having received a telephone call from The Netherlands Minister of Defence at this time, requesting that the close air support action be discontinued, because Serb soldiers on the scene were too close to Netherlands troops, and their safety would be jeopardized. The Special Representative considered that he had no choice but to comply with the request.”
effective controlover deployment of the air force was being exercised we are unable to see why Voorhoeve still saw occasion to phone Akashi in the afternoon. Seen in that light there are insufficient indications that CAS was discontinued immediately after it had begun due to intervention by the State given the additional fact that at about 14:45 hours bombs were being dropped.
Admiral Smith has agreed to our request, proposed by The Netherlands minister of defence to the SRSG, to suspend air presence and close air support missions over Srebrenica. It is our view that they would endanger the civilian population and our own personnel who are now intermingled with Serb forces.”(NIOD, p. 2,301).
close air support: suspension was suggested by “
the extreme confusion on the ground in the Srebrenica area and especially the current BSA threat to the thousands of Bosnian refugees in the Northern part of the area, as well as the UNPROFOR forces”(NIOD, p. 2,301)
.That
Deputy Force CommanderAshton stated to NIOD that even before Voorhoeve had phoned Akashi had taken the decision not to deploy any further
close air supportis something the District Court regards it as relevant. This statement corresponds with statements by Kolsteren and an employee of Akashi (NIOD Report, p. 2305). Moreover De Jonge and De Ruiter made statements to the effect that calling off the
close air supportwas not connected with the phone call between Voorhoeve and Akashi but that it was based on military reasons and the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had become intermingled with the refugees and the Dutchbatters (NIOD Report, p. 2305).
“Give me two regiments I will jump and retake Srebrenica.”This French plan was made known at a press conference on July 11th 1995. Claimants point to the reaction of the Council of Ministers to these plans that found said announcements to be hardly credible given the background developments (NIOD, p. 2411 ff.). Claimants also point to the opinion of Van den Breemen that retaking Srebrenica would be irresponsible as long as there continued to be Dutch nationals in the
safe areasince they would be at risk. According to Claimants this evidences the fact that there was a constant pattern in the politics of The Netherlands and the army command to completely subordinate the interests of the refugees to that of themselves.
safe areaby military means and that the conclusion was “
that retaking the enclave was a pious hope but that the troops needed to do so just weren’t available”and that
“Van den Breemen (…) had called a helicopter operation with six hundred personnel a complete non-operation that could moreover endanger those Dutch nationals still present in the enclave.”The NIOD Report then goes on to describe how the Government of The Netherlands had asked for the British and the American views via their accredited attachés in The Hague as follows:
“their reaction was no different to that of The Hague.”The NIOD Report goes on to state that the UN in the words of Janvier and Akashi had rejected military intervention that other countries too continued to hold back from accepting the plan and that more reactions rejecting the plan came in that would have affected the demeanour of representatives at the UN and/or NATO and meant this was not carried out (NIOD, pp. 2414 to 2417).
effective controlby the Government of The Netherlands over the implementation of the French plan. In addition Claimants have not put forward any specific facts and circumstances from which to deduce this. The Government of The Netherlands was one of the Governments that along with the UN had doubts as to the feasibility of the French plan for the recapture of Srebrenica.
to use all resources available”and had a preference for the form of words
“to use his best efforts”and The Netherlands in connection with this withdrew as co-sponsor of this resolution that on July 12th 1995 was adopted unanimously. This position of the Government of The Netherlands provides no evidence of
effective controljust as the assessment of Van Kappen the Dutch military advisor to the Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali to the effect that the recapture of Srebrenica from both a military and a political point of view was not feasible. Van Kappen acted as an official of the UN. It has not been argued nor proven that the Government of The Netherlands influenced his estimation in any way. As previously explained the fact that Van Kappen is a Dutch national in no way implies that the State exercised
effective controlor that Van Kappen’s estimation is attributable to the State.
blocking positions
2.Unlawfulness of Dutchbat’s actions attributable to the State
seriatimthe applicable law and the assessment framework (A) and the unlawfulness of the accusations attributable to the State as summarised earlier (B). There follows under (C) the conclusion regarding the claims based on an unlawful act and the claim specifically tailored to the supposed violation of the Genocide Convention.
seriatimwith the national law that according to Dutch international private law applies to the claim under the heading unlawful act (ii) and into the substance of these standards governing unlawful acts (iii).
- Violating the mandate by not supplying humanitarian assistance and not defending the
- Violating international humanitarian law (the Geneva Conventions, Article 87 of the First Supplementary Protocol to these Conventions and the SOP) by not reporting war crimes Dutchbat had observed whereby Claimants also appeal to Article 1 paragraph 3 of the UN Charter
- Failing to prevent genocide as prescribed in Article I of the Genocide Convention
- Violating human rights
Grondwet (Gw)[= Constitution] provisions of treaties and decisions of international law organisations may be legally binding on all as to their substance with legally binding powers coming into effect after they are published. For a provision of a treaty or a decision of an international law organisation to become qualified as ‘binding on all’ it must be eligible for immediate applicability in cases submitted to a court of law. It must be a provision that is sufficiently precise as to the right it confers or the obligation it imposes on subjects so that in the national system of laws they can operate without question as objective law. On other forms of international law namely those whose provisions in the form of treaties and international decisions are not binding on all as well as the totality of the international law of custom whether or not characterised by
ius cogensSection 93 Gw does not apply. Said right remains in effect within the system of laws of The Netherlands by means of application of national law for example through the law governing the unlawful act.
“within their jurisdiction”guarantee the rights and freedoms as enacted in the first title of the Convention. Under Article 2 paragraph 2 ICCPR Contracting States undertake to respect and guarantee convention rights
“within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction”. Although the concept of jurisdiction in both conventions is not identical it is accepted that both concepts be interpreted in the same way and parties do not argue otherwise. In respect of both conventions it holds that only in very extreme cases does a state have jurisdiction beyond the borders of its own territory.
safe areathat had to protect the civilians against the Bosnian Serbs and Dutchbat’s presence was of crucial importance for the existence of the
safe area.
mini safe areaand the refugees present there. Dutchbat’s deployment did not concern the exercise of
“public powers”by
the Statein the form of
“executive or judicial functions”in the
safe areathat would normally be implemented by the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Prior to the fall of Srebrenica Dutchbat was operating within the
command and controlstructure of the UN as previously explained. SOFA is an agreement between the UN and Bosnia-Herzegovina from which no starting point for the formal authority of the State can be derived.
safe areaand as such exercised
“effective control”over the
safe area. They also argue that the refugees in the
mini safe areawere under Dutchbat’s supervision. In this position the District Court follows Claimants in part.
effective controlcriterion in the context of attributing actions to the State and in the context of the jurisdiction of the State which criterion is applied in both cases according to the circumstances of the case. In this way a state can have
effective controlover an area without exercising
effective controlover the specific actions of individuals in that area and vice-versa.
“physical power and control”as referred to in the judgment over the populace in the
safe area. The same holds for the refugees who after the fall of Srebrenica remained in the
mini safe area. In addition the actual situation as described above did not form a proper basis for the conclusion that through Dutchbat the State had
“domination”over the
safe area. For this it is again relevant that Dutchbat operated within the
command and controlstructure of the UN and that Dutchbat had limited manpower.
effective controlas understood in the Al-Skeini judgment over the compound. The compound was a fenced-off area in which Dutchbat had the say and over which the UN after the fall of Srebrenica exercised almost no actual say any more. In addition we have established the fact that other than the
mini safe areathe Bosnian Serbs respected this area and left it untroubled after the fall of Srebrenica.
vis-à-visthose persons who as of the fall of Srebrenica were in the compound. The State was not able to do this for the populace of the
safe areaprior to the fall of Srebrenica and even less after that
vis-à-visthe refugees in the
mini safe areathat lay beyond the compound or beyond the
mini safe area. This assessment is confirmed in the conclusion of the Supreme Court in its profuse deliberations in the Mustafić and Nuhanović cases namely that after the fall of Srebrenica the State exercised jurisdiction in the sense in which that is understood by the ECHR and ICCPR at the compound.
inter aliato
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Lawthat the General Assembly of the UN adopted in Resolution 60/147 of December 16th 2005.
ius cogensrule since any such rule is not yet a provision binding on all in the sense of Section 93 Gw and does not create enforceable obligations to which Claimants are legally entitled.
“mechanism for the implementation of existing legal obligations under international human rights law and international humanitarian law”as wished for in the aforementioned
Basic Principlesof the Member States.
acta jure imperii.Till the current Section 10:159 BW came into force the international private law of The Netherlands contained no codified special rule governing the choice of law for
acta jure imperii. Section 10:159 BW stipulates that
acta jure imperiishould be assessed according to the law of the State that exercised said authority. According to the explanation the basis of said indicative ruling is that:
the exercise of government authority is pre-eminently an area left to the sovereignty of the State concerned. In doing so foreign law should not be applied to the question whether in exercising authority we can speak of there being unlawful acts and if so to what extent this leads to liability.”
Wet Conflictenrecht Onrechtmatige daad(hereinafter to be referred to as: WCOD) [= Unlawful Act (Conflict of Laws) Act].
acta jure imperiithere is
inter aliathe following:
The legislative bill only lays down the most important rules of the international unlawful act and in so doing ties in with the COVA judgment referred to.”(TK 1998/99, 26608, no. 3, p. 2
.). From this explanation the District Court deduces that not all of the rules of unwritten private law in The Netherlands are codified in the WCOD and this apparently includes the now codified rule governing the choice of law that relates to the very rare situation whereby the State becomes liable for government troops outside The Netherlands.
acta jure imperiihas for decades had a special place in the international private law of The Netherlands when answering the question whether a state enjoys immunity from jurisdiction. In that connection the thought in the explanation to 10:159 BW lies equally at the basis of the starting point namely that in cases of
acta jurii imperiiit may only be summoned to appear before a court of law on its own territory and beyond that enjoys immunity from jurisdiction.
safe areaagainst armed attack and other hostile actions on the part of the Bosnian Serbs. This idea of protection should always have been uppermost in the mind of Dutchbat during its acts of commission and/or omission.
safe areawas there to protect the right to life and the integrity of the human person inasmuch as that may reasonably asked of it.
Bosnia Herzegovina Command. That as the State argues and in the absence of knowledge Claimants dispute the obligation only held for verified crimes is insufficiently explained partly because this criterion does not appear from the only available secondary source in this case namely the NIOD Report. SOP 208 was based on all relevant international conventions, charters and Security Council resolutions relating to human rights and war crimes including the Geneva Conventions (NIOD, p. 2653). SOP 208 was intended to provide a short-term deterrent for combative parties and for the longer term to create the potential for prosecuting those committing war crimes (NIOD, p. 2655).
versusSerbia and Montenegro the ICJ [= International Court of Justice] devoted various general deliberations to the obligation resting on the State:
conditio sine qua non)is present if it can be established with a sufficient degree of certainty that without the unlawful actions the damage would not have occurred. In this case we have therefore to examine whether with a sufficient degree of certainty it may be established that the men from the
safe areawould not have been killed without the unlawful actions of the State.
mini safe areaprior to and after the fall of Srebrenica and (ii) Dutchbat’s actions within the
mini safe areaafter the fall of Srebrenica.
seriatimClaimants’ accusations in terms of (a) Dutchbat’s actions in relation to the
blocking positions(b) not abandoning observation posts after the fall of Srebrenica and (c) handing in weapons and other equipment at the observation posts.
blocking positionsto prevent any further advance by the Bosnian Serbs towards the town of Srebrenica. In this connection Claimants point out that the commander of Dutchbat’s B company Captain Groen interpreted incorrectly the order by instructing his men that only if there were a direct attack could they use self-defence and only then if it was necessary whereby initially they were to fire over the heads of the Bosnian Serbs. According to Claimants in doing so Dutchbat allowed its own safety to prevail over that of the task with which it had been charged namely to protect the populace in the
safe areaas is also evidenced by Karremans’ statement in response to the current order namely,
“that he thought his troops were too good to be sacrificed”.According to Claimants Dutchbat had abandoned the
blocking positionstoo quickly and too easily and at the last
blocking positiontaken had acted contrary to Gobilliard’s order by leaving it unfortified.
blocking positionsDutchbat was to take up as being
“a line in the sand”(the so-called “
horizontal 84”,a line on the map at approximately one-and-a-half kilometres south of the town of Srebrenica). Besides the order of July 9th 1995 to take up the
blocking positionsa warning was issued to the Bosnian Serbs from the UN chain of command that an attack on the
blocking positionsDutchbat had taken up would be regarded as unacceptable and could lead to deployment of CAS. Within Dutchbat Franken explained the order to Groen. In doing so Franken made it known that the order should be regarded as being a “
green assignment”. Franken thus confirmed the assignment by fax that B company had to set up a line of defence and had to prevent the Bosnian Serbs from getting through to the town of Srebrenica by all available means. The fax message underlined the fact that this was a “
green assignment with serious intent”. In his statement to the Parliamentary committee of inquiry Groen explained his chosen way of implementing the assignment as follows:
We had the advantage that everyone had grown up with the entire situation and everyone had already been in the area for six months. So everyone knew how the situation had developed and everyone knew that we still had to try and act to de-escalate the situation. If we had opened fire without giving it serious thought we would have risked forfeiting our UN status in the eyes of the adversary even if perhaps we had not thought so ourselves. Then the question is what would this achieve; you run the risk of just being seen as an adversary like the jihadis. For that matter the jihadis had tried constantly to get us onto their side and to give up our impartial status so that we could fight against the Bosnian Serbs together. Naturally we wished to avoid that as we were impartial there and that was precisely why we could act as a human shield between the Bosnian Serb forces and the civilian population which is in my opinion what it was all about.
blocking positions(Bravo 1-4): Bravo-1 was at Stupine to the west of the town of Srebrenica, Bravo-2 and Bravo-4 were on the road from Zeleni Jadar to Srebrenica. Bravo-3 was at observation post OP-H to the east of Srebrenica on the road that leads to Srebrenica from Mt. Kvarac via Crni Guber. Since you could cover the position of Bravo-2 from Bravo-4 in practice Bravo-2 became redundant. On July 10th 1995 Bosnian Serbs shot at Bravo-3 three times. From Bravo-3 Dutchbat shot over the heads of the VRS units. At 19:13 hours Groen gave the order to the garrison at Bravo-1 to withdraw to Srebrenica. After this the garrisons at Bravo-3 and 4 began to withdraw. There from Bravo-1 Dutchbat fired shots over the heads of VRS units. In the night of July 10th to 11th 1995 the garrisons at Bravo-1, 3 and 4 remained in the town of Srebrenica. On the orders of Franken at 10:44 hours the garrison of Bravo-1 moved 500 metres to the south. At 11:17 hours Franken gave the instruction to shoot “at will”. After coming under fire from VRS lorries Bravo-1 received the order to withdraw to the compound at Srebrenica. On July 11th 1995 after CAS had been given that led to heavier attacks from the Bosnian Serbs Groen gave Bravo-1 the order to abandon its position and together with the garrisons from Bravo-3 and 4 to withdraw from Srebrenica in the direction of Potočari. Franken then gave Groen the order to take up a new
blocking positionclose to where the road turns off to go to Susnjari just to the south of the factory complexes at Potočari. This
blocking positionwas abandoned under threat from VRS units and disarmed by Bosnian Serbs.
blocking positionsand Dutchbat’s actions consequent upon said instruction. The order from Sarajevo relating to the
blocking positionsthat speaks of doing “
everything possible” to “
fortify these positions including reinforcing them”according to the District Court provides enough room for Groen’s chosen manner of implementing it. Claimants’ sole argument that Groen’s choice was “incomprehensible”, or that Dutchbat could have implemented the order in some other way e.g. by using as Claimants suggest more force does not mean this is contrary to the order. Moreover the District Court is unable to agree with Claimants’ position that Dutchbat gave up the
blocking positionstoo readily. In doing so the District Court also takes into consideration the fact that Dutchbat had insufficient equipment to be able actually to stop the advance of the Bosnian Serbs on the ground. Claimants have not contradicted the fact that Dutchbat with the arms it had was only in a position to shoot at the Bosnian Serb infantry and not at the same time at the artillery and the tanks that formed the greatest threat to Dutchbat and the populace in the
safe area. Besides this it is also relevant to take as being established that the Dutchbatters in their
blocking positionswere facing the overpowering manpower of the Bosnian Serbs and were thus in a severe minority. Nor could Dutchbat be expected to keep on manning the
blocking positionswhen requests for CAS were not being honoured by the UN chain of command and when on July 11th 1995 CAS did indeed arrive it did not have the desired effect but led precisely to an intensification of the Bosnian Serb attacks.
Ultimately, it is not possible to say with any certainty that stronger actions by Dutchbat would have saved lives, and it is even possible that such efforts could have done more harm than good.”(No 473).
blocking positionsas Claimants support could be regarded as in any way a ‘better’ alternative than the way in which Dutchbat chose to implement the order. No facts or circumstances have been argued or appear on which basis the question could be answered unequivocally in the affirmative.
blocking positions. On this point then there is no question of any unlawful acts.
blocking positionon July 11th 1995. This happened after VRS troops with whom Dutchbatters were speaking aimed their weapons at the Dutchbatters and made them ready to fire (NIOD, p. 2250). It appears that the Dutchbatters did not have a realistic alternative when under threat of arms they were urged to hand over their weapons and other equipment. That they did so contrary to the orders of Gobilliard is in itself insufficient to qualify their actions
vis-à-visClaimants as unlawful.
mini safe areawould have taken place in some other way and in particular that men would have escaped death or that Dutchbat would have acted differently if the Dutchbatters who fell into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs had been in the
mini safe areaduring the evacuation of the refugees and the garrison of observation post OP-P had arrived there earlier. The causal link between immediately leaving the observation posts and the loss Claimants suffered is missing too. We can leave without discussion as to whether abandoning the observation posts is an unlawful act.
mini safe area(1) a discussion of the accusations follows (2).
mini safe areain the transitional period (a) then during the evacuation of the refugees from the
mini safe area(b) and the genocide of the men who came from the
safe areaand the war crimes the Bosnian Serbs committed in Potočari (c). After that the District Court will discuss Dutchbat’s observation of war crimes the Bosnian Serbs committed (d) and what Dutchbat knew or could have suspected about the fate of the male refugees the Bosnian Serbs took away from the
mini safe area(e). Finally the District Court will reflect on what Dutchbat knew or could suspect as to the fate of the men who did not flee to the
mini safe areabut to the woods (f).
mini safe areawas created consisting of Dutchbat’s compound in Potočari and the area in the vicinity to the south of the compound on both sides of a road where
inter aliaa number of factory hallways and a bus depot were located. There were about 150 Dutchbatters at the compound. The
mini safe areawas cordoned off with tape. Dutchbat had blocked the approach roads to this area with armed vehicles and had set up perimeter checkpoints at the
mini safe area. Approximately 5,000 refugees had been accommodated. The remainder of the refugees were in the part of the
mini safe arealocated beyond the compound.
mini safe area.The District Court agrees with this and with the reiteration of the facts referred to (see 2.35) The total number of refugees matches the number of refugees the ICTY established were in the
mini safe area.The precise number of refugees is difficult to establish even according to the NIOD. We are not ruling out then that there were about 30,000 refugees beyond the compound as Claimants assert. That corresponds with the estimate cited from the MSF and the
United Nations Military Observers(UNMO) in the NIOD Report (on p. 2620) The District Court’s assessment would not be any different however if we were to take Claimants’ number of refugees referred to as our starting point.
mini safe area.Based on an internally prepared extrapolation by co-workers of the prosecutor at the ICTY for the purpose of the Krstić case NIOD has accepted that probably around 2,000 men were in Potočari of whom three-quarters were of fighting age i.e. 16 to 60 years of age (NIOD Report, p. 2620). The ICTY deliberated that according to witness estimates at least 300 men were at the compound and between 600 and 900 in the rest of the
mini safe area(Krstić legal ground no 37) and that the Bosnian Serbs selected and carried off about 1,000 men from the
mini safe area(Krstić legal ground no 66). The District Court takes as its starting point the fact that the men formed a small minority within the totality of the group of refugees in the
mini safe area.
the 239 list” or “
the Franken list”. The list consisted of 251 names. Around 70 men refused to put their names on the list because they were afraid of problems instead of protection. The NIOD Report concluded that about 320 men were at the compound (NIOD, p. 2659). This matches up with witness estimates of at least 300 men to which the ICTY refers (Krstić legal ground no 37).
mini safe areacircumstances were poor. The ICTY deliberated as follows:
compoundFranken made the following statement to the Parliamentary committee of inquiry:
There wasn’t any. That’s probably the best answer I can give. People were so panic-stricken that they were doing their doings in the hallway entirely understandably for that matter. When that occurs where there are 5,000 people in a temperature of 30 degrees above zero sitting in a bare concrete hallway you can imagine what that’s like. We didn’t have any water for them to wash in though we did manage to arrange for water for babies and handtowels and that sort of thing that the men could hand in and that could be used as nappies for babies and small children. People were sitting there impassively in that filthy mess and women were lying there giving birth; it’s most unusual. Let me just put it like that.”(PE hearings, p. 74).
People were already dying. We had buried nine or eleven people at the base who had not died as a result of acts of war but because of exhaustion and such like. My information was that with a level of certainty of one less or one more depending on the weather we could do it for another four days.”(PE hearings, p. 73).
mini safe area.
“after screening the men would be returned to the enclave”(IGH February 26th 2007, legal ground no 287). After it had first been agreed that Dutchbat would supervise the evacuation and arrange transportation for the refugees in the final talk with Karremans Mladić made it known that he would be taking care of transport.
mini safe areaand the evacuation of the refugees began. The evacuation began in chaos: there was a massive
runon the buses whereby the refugees threatened to trample one another underfoot. The first buses were overfull.
mini safe area(Krstić legal ground no 53). The men who managed to get to the first buses arrived safely along with the other refugees in Kladanj (NIOD, p. 2,651). After that the Bosnian Serbs stopped buses on their way screening them for men (Krstić legal ground no 56). In addition men who had come with the other refugees were taken out of the buses where they were to alight at Tišca and were carried off by the Bosnian Serbs who left the other refugees undisturbed (NIOD, p. 2,651).
mini safe areasituated beyond the compound. Then finally a start was made with carrying off the refugees from the compound. The NIOD Report states that this was going on at about 16:00 hours (p. 2701) but according to the UN Report this was at about 17:15 hours (no 348). In the evening of July 13th 1995 according to the ICTY at 20:00 hours the evacuation of these refugees was complete (Krstić legal ground no 51). The compound was then populated by Dutchbat and the UN and MSF employees that left on July 21st 1995 along with Dutchbat.
mini safe areabut to the woods and had been held captive by the Bosnian Serbs were also taken to Bratunac. In total about 7,000 men from the
safe areawere killed in mass executions by the Bosnian Serbs that began on July 13th 1995 in the region to the north of the town of Srebrenica and then on July 14th up to and including July 17th 1995 at various places to the north of Bratunac (Krstić legal ground no 59, 66 to 67).
mini safe areaand the men who had not fled to the
mini safe areaand were held captive elsewhere is genocide in the sense in which that is understood in the Genocide Convention. In this connection the ICTY deliberated as follows:
opportunistic killings”:
cannot find that the killings committed in Potočari on 12 and 13 July formed part of the plan to kill all the military aged men. Nevertheless, the Trial Chamber is confident that the mass executions and other killings committed from 13 July onwards were part of this plan.”(Krstić legal ground no 573).
mini safe area,raping women, separating the men from the rest of the refugees and
“deporting”refugees. The discussion that follows on after this is aimed at Dutchbat’s observations of the killing and maltreatment of male refugees and of the rape of women in the
mini safe areaand in Potočari.
mini safe areaand definitely not in the night of July 12th to 13th 1995. All the same Dutchbatters did observe war crimes being committed by Bosnian Serbs in the night of July 12th to 13th 1995.
Not normal fighting fire, shots with intervening gaps. To execute people”
that on July 12th he saw that in the afternoon between 12 noon and two o’clock a group of five Muslim men under supervision of an armed VRS combatant were running away. He saw them at a distance of between two and three hundred metres go into a house on the hill diagonally opposite the big factory […] Shortly after that he heard five or six shots. After some time he saw an armed BSA [VRS] combatant again come outside. He saw that said BSA combatant had nothing more than a pistol with him.” (NIOD, p. 2,680)
civilian lorry with the hood closed”driving towards a house that ten men had just entered and that stopped next to the house. The account of the facts in the debriefing states: “
He then heard shots being fired in the direct vicinity of the house referred to. Some minutes later he heard and saw the lorry referred driving away from the house in a northerly direction. Based on the foregoing he suspected that possibly ten Muslims had been shot dead by BSA (VRS) soldiers.”(NIOD, p. 2,682);
Rambo types”setting light to houses in the hills in the vicinity of Potočari and later that night threatening to slit the throat of a young man who had been wounded (legal ground no 153, footnote 342)
mini safe areawhere the Bosnian Serbs had taken the men they had selected from the rows of men of fighting age. He heard a shot and saw the VRS soldiers return without the man (Krstić legal ground no 58)
mini safe areaand an AK-47 being fired that made him conclude that refugees in that house were being killed (legal ground no 153, footnote 344)
Then I got to see […] the people who[two VRS soldiers, District Court’s addition]
they had been calling. Under the large tree there stood a small group of Bosnian Serb civilians. In their midst sat a man on his knees. The soldiers exchanged some words with the civilians after which one of the soldiers harshly dragged with him the struggling man. They disappeared from my view around the back of a small house. I at once heard someone shriek and a shot. The soldier came back and then he gave a number of civilians a hand as if they were old friends.” (NIOD, p. 2675)
A young lad drew our attention to bodies lying there. In response in the evening we went to take a look in the enclave and found bodies of Muslims there. It appeared that these were executions since they had all been laid down neatly on their bellies. A colleague took photos. We had to do it on the quiet because in the meantime the Serbs were cleansing the houses in the vicinity.”(NIOD, p. 2722)
there was a report of someone who at quite a distance had seen the execution of a single man.” (PE hearings, p.76). This could perhaps be one of the executions of a man by Bosnian Serbs mentioned above and observed by Dutchbat.
I was concerned about the men. When the first reports came in stating that they were being beaten I sent the UNMOs (…) over there. (…) I received reports that they had gained the impression that it had quietened down because of their presence there but that they were acting rather rough. More and more reports came in.” (PE hearings, p.77).
a complete fear of death: you could smell death”(NIOD, pp. 2718 to 2719, source in footnote 612, PE hearings, 46 to 47).
Vrij Nederland[= a newspaper] that on July 13th 1995 whilst travelling from an observation post to the compound he saw “
corpses everywhere” and smelt “
the dreadful smell of dead bodies” that it was then at the time clear to him that “
people were just being shot dead over there” and finally that despite his reports during his debriefing in Assen as to this in the debriefing report the only thing that came out right was that “
it is possible that something strange was going on over there”.
Wherever possible the ‘narrow’ approach was maintained and disagreeable subjects were avoided and left underexposed” (NIOD, p. 3001).
identity papers” described in the debriefing report as “
personal possessions” (PE Report, p. 338). Moreover whilst drawing up the debriefing report apparently the rule held that an observation was not accepted if no “
evidence of support” was regarded as being present (PE Report, p. 337).
mini safe areain the days following on from the arrival of the refugees there on July 11th 1995 as follows:
By all accounts, the harassment of the Srebrenica refugees by Serb forces was too widespread and persuasive to be overlooked.”(Krstić legal ground no 155).
safe areaand to paragraphs 14, 17, 19 and 27 ‘g’ of the
Report of the Security Council Mission established pursuant to resolution 819 (1993)April 30th 1993 (UN Doc, S/25700). There the conclusion is drawn that without the demilitarisation agreement of April 18th 1993 (see 2.18) a “
massacre of 25,000 people”could have taken place that justifies the efforts of UNPROFOR with the critical note in the margin that the fact that the Bosnian Serbs had little respect for the authority of UNPROFOR is a point of particular interest for the UN. Claimants further emphasise that in its pronouncement of February 26th 2007 the IGH had deliberated as follows:
(…) given all the international concern about what looked likely to happen at Srebrenica, (…), it must have been clear that there was a serious risk of genocide in Srebrenica”.
safe areaeven before the fall of Srebrenica.
serious riskof genocide (legal ground no 436):
serious riskof genocide that one of the 7,000 men was out of the
safe area. Dutchbat’s observations however must be seen against the background of the actual general concern in the international community and that this obliged Dutchbat to be more alert.
“ethnic cleansing”that is discussed in the mandate (see 2.7) is linked to the cleansing of Bosnia of other ethnic groups by the Bosnian Serbs in their struggle towards a “
Greater Serbia”.During the conflict in Bosnian Herzegovina there was earlier and for that matter on both sides
ethnic cleansingin areas that had been captured. That the Bosnian Serbs would attempt to drive out non-Serbian ethnic groups from the area should be seen against this background and could be reasonably expected to happen. That does not hold for the genocide that took place in respect of the men from the
safe area.
mini safe areait boils down to facts and circumstances that Dutchbat knew about at the time and the conclusions that in the given circumstances they made or reasonably could have made and had to make. In this regard the District Court deliberates as follows.
The Prosecution’s military experts accepted that it was not inherently unreasonable or criminal for the Bosnian Serbs to conduct such screening given widespread and plausible allegations that Bosnian Muslim raiders from Srebrenica had committed war crimes against Bosnian Serb villages.” (Krstić legal ground no 156).
mini safe areaor to transport them to Kladanj. Handling the men during screening had to be according to the Geneva Conventions.
opportunistic killingsto use the words of the ICTY therefore together with reports of the use of physical violence against those being interrogated form a strong indication that the men the Bosnian Serbs had selected ran a real risk of death or inhumane treatment.
“it already appeared worse for the men than you could have imagined beforehand”(PE hearings, p. 76). Franken had then considered stopping the evacuation but decided not to do so in the interests of the large numbers of women and children who were being brought to safety because of it. Franken did however have a list drawn up on July 12th 1995 of the names of the men in the compound because of his concern and in the hope that this would act to protect them. His statement about this to the Parliamentary committee of inquiry is as follows:
When I thought about how I could offer the men some sort of protection a trick from Amnesty [= Amnesty International] suddenly came to mind: anonymous victims are no victims. I then tried to find ways of giving the men an identity. You can do this in several ways for example by taking photos but I did not have those resources to hand. I then consulted with the committee we had meanwhile set up the well-known troika that acted to represent the refugees, tried to register all of the men with full name, date of birth, place of birth etc. It was the intention that I would bring out the list – I had also informed the Serbs that I had registered them – and that where possible I would publish the list to put the Serbs under a certain amount of pressure: watch out we know precisely who has left and we can monitor them and follow them.”(PE hearings, p. 77).
serious riskof genocide of the men separated and carried off from Potočari by the Bosnian Serbs as referred to in the deliberation cited in 4.178 of the IGH: the Bosnian Serbs systematically selected men who were then badly treated and stripped of their identity papers – so that they could no longer be identified – and then carried off separately to an unknown destination.
serious riskof genocide the State points out that the IGH deliberated that not until July 14th 1995 was it clear that there was a
serious riskof genocide.
Serbian Stateleaves intact that based on the facts and circumstances they knew of others were at some other moment aware or should have been aware of a
serious riskof genocide. The opinion of the IGH therefore provides room for judging that
Dutchbatin the given circumstances in respect of the men in the
mini safe areaat some other moment – namely at the end of the afternoon of July 13th 1995 – should have been aware of a
serious riskof genocide of the men who had been carried off from the
mini safe area.
mini safe areabut to the woods were literally out of Dutchbat’s sight. Dutchbat was aware that a large part of the male population from Srebrenica had not fled to the
mini safe area. Van Duijn made the following statement before the Dutch parliamentary committee of inquiry:
mini safe areahad fallen into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs and were killed during the mass executions that occurred from 13th July 1995. There is insufficient basis to hold that on 11th July 1995 – or at any other moment in the following days – Dutchbat was or became aware of the danger those men were in. Nor is there sufficient basis to hold, in the given circumstances and given its knowledge at the time about the fate of the men who had been or would be carried off by the Bosnian Serbs from the
mini safe area, that Dutchbat could and should have known or suspected that the other men who had not fled to the
mini safe areahad fallen or would fall into the hands of the Bosnian Serbs and what their fate would be. The reasoning that Dutchbat knew that many men from Srebrenica had not fled to the
mini safe areaand that it was clear that the area outside the
mini safe areawas not safe because the men were fleeing through an area controlled by the Bosnian Serbs which was also full of landmines, is insufficient.
mini safe areabut to the woods were meeting certain death or inhumane treatment, its advice to flee to the woods – even if this advice was indeed given, which the State disputes – and not raising the alarm about it cannot be deemed as unlawful. Dutchbat could reasonably proceed to do so in the given circumstances.
seriatimthe following accusations of Claimants about Dutchbat’s actions and assess whether they lead to liability of the State on account of unlawful acts:
Bosnia Herzegovina Commandin Sarajevo and also brought it to the attention of Nicolai. Although Karremans stated during the debriefing in Assen that he also orally reported Groenewegen’s observation in the afternoon of 12th or 13th July 1995 of an execution of a refugee at about 200 meters from the compound to the UN chain of command, the District Court is unable to establish with a sufficient degree of certainty – since confirmation from another (Dutchbat) source is not available – that the notification of Groenewegen’s observation actually left the compound. The District Court takes into consideration that the NIOD raised the question whether Karremans may have made a mistake regarding this aspect, as he had stated during the debriefing in Zagreb on 22th July 1995 that he had no knowledge of any eyewitness accounts of actual executions (NIOD, p. 2720, middle). It has not been asserted, nor is there any evidence that Dutchbat made any other notifications.
mini safe arealocated outside the compound on its own, i.e. without outside help, due to its limited manpower and due to the superior military strength of the Bosnian Serbs. Furthermore, Dutchbat at most had a clear view of the men selected by the Bosnian Serbs who were being held in various buildings outside the
mini safe area. In these circumstances Dutchbat had the obligation to report the war crimes it had directly and indirectly witnessed up to that point as well as from that moment onwards to the UN chain of command.
359. Thus, on 13 July, there was strong alarm expressed at various levels that abuses may have been or were being committed against the men of Srebrenica, but none had been confirmed to have taken place at that time. Efforts were nevertheless focused at the highest levels to try and address the situation.”
safe areaand that such an operation was not feasible from a military point of view, or at least that the success of such an operation was entirely uncertain. Furthermore, the State points out the conclusion drawn by deputy head of Operations Hilderink, shortly after the fall of Srebrenica, that there were not enough troops available for the recapture and that the accelerated build-up of the
Rapid Reaction Forcedid not offer possibilities: by the time the troops could have been deployed, all refugees would already have left the
mini safe area(NIOD, pp. 2414 to 2415).
sinister indications” about crimes against male refugees, albeit possibly in less great numbers and less detailed than the indications Dutchbat had. It does not become apparent from the UN report or any other source that a military intervention shortly after the fall of the
safe areawas not launched (simply) because the “
sinister indications” available to the UN Secretary-General were not confirmed yet (by the report of direct observations of Dutchbat). However, there are strong indications that this intervention was not effected due to the lack of feasibility.
safe area,and the hesitations and negative reactions to plans to that effect expressed by the UN and the international community were discussed. This uncertainty is also present in the opinions of Hilderink and Van Kappen, on which Claimants have not taken a reasoned or substantiated position to the contrary apart from their standpoint given in 4.271. Claimants’ standpoint does not carry sufficient weight against the practical barriers and obstacles to a timely military intervention, which are not contested with reasons by Claimants, and against the hesitations of the UN and the international community about a timely military intervention. Claimants’ standpoint therefore provides insufficient basis for the conclusion that Dutchbat’s compliance with the duty to report could have led to a timely deployment of the
Rapid Reaction Force.
safe arealay outside the capabilities of UNPROFOR, all the more so because a possibly military action would have to be undertaken out of sight of a hostile population and in all probability would have led to an overt war with Bosnian Serbs and possible even Yugoslavia, as NATO would have had to attack the integrated air defence system. This was the last word on the French ideas discussed in 4.138 and elsewhere about recapturing the
safe area(NIOD, p. 2429). Van Kappen analysis applied in full to the situation on July 12th and 13th 1995.
provide medical assistance and assist local medical authorities”. In this context, Claimants point out an internal Dutchbat memorandum of July 10th 1995 which states that priority was given to keeping a “base stock” for possible Dutchbat victims and Karremans’ order, a “low point” for Claimants, not to carry out operations on refugees.
The entire compound was in the Serb artillery’s line of direct fire. The Serbs were close on the right side of the CL, from where they had a complete view of our compound. By the time the refugees started to arrive I had no idea how things would progress. We then decided that we should at least make sure that the refugees would be protected from the Serbs to some degree and that they would not be stuck in open terrain. There was a huge factory building in the centre of the base. It was in a deplorable state, but did meet our requirements. I had to try to get the people inside, as it was also incredibly hot. And I had to prevent large-scale panic from breaking out among the refugees at the sight of a Serb. I also had to maintain our freedom of action to be able to deploy military means. If I had let all refugees in, the base would have been overcrowded from fence to fence and we would have lost our freedom of movement. I also would not have been able to anticipate something – anything – that could have happened. That is the reason why I said: Okay, we can take in refugees at the base, for sure. We can have the factory’s ground floor inspected. I ordered one of the military engineers to inspect the upper floor, because the building had suffered quite a lot of damage during previous hostilities. He believed that we could also use the upper floor, which we did. So we let in the maximum number of refugees at the base. We housed the others in the buildings directly outside the base.”(PE hearings, p. 71).
Malieveldwhere crowds of about 20,000 to 25,000 people convene for demonstrations, a large part of the refugees would have been housed outdoors, in sight and in the field of fire of the Bosnian Serbs, who had threatened to open fire at the compound if Dutchbat received refugees there. Furthermore, maintaining freedom of movement at the compound for Dutchbat, which was also included in Franken’s consideration, was in the interest of the reception of and assistance to the refugees. When also considering the very precarious living conditions at the compound, admitting all refugees after all (about 25,000) at the compound during the transition period was not a realistic option.
mini safe areaat the time still was not a viable option. Although it concerned less refugees than the day before, following the evacuation of 4,000 to 5,000 refugees, Franken’s consideration still applied and also to the remaining refugees, while the refugees’ circumstances were also visibly deteriorating.
mini safe areathat lay just outside the compound and bringing them to the compound. Aside from the fact whether or not the circumstances would have permitted the reception of these men, there are no indications that this would have been practicable, also in view of the limited manpower available to Dutchbat and the risk of endangering the evacuation of the other refugees, whose interests were best served with evacuation. The District Court therefore also finds the decision not to allow the male refugees entry to the compound during the transition period not unlawful.
evacuationregarding Dutchbat’s decisions about all refugees after the fall, the removal of the refugees other than the male refugees by the Bosnian Serbs and in assessing the attributability of Dutchbat’s actions during the transition period. The District Court did not use this term when it concerned the removal of the male refugees selected by the Bosnian Serbs. Like Claimants, the District Court is of the opinion that the designation evacuation does not do justice to the actual situation of the removal of the male refugees, which was a
deportation. The term evacuation does apply to the removal of the other refugees from the
mini safe area, for which the District Court takes into consideration that a safe haven had to be found for the refugees after the fall of Srebrenica and that there was no reason to have concerns about the fate of these refugees. The fact that the men were removed from the queues for the buses, is not reason enough to also designate the removal of the other refugees as deportation.
runon the buses, which can be explained by the miserable conditions in which the refugees had been staying at and around the compound, Dutchbat only wanted to channel and guide the evacuation of refugees.
(…) the only goal we had in mind at that time was to prevent people from collapsing, being trampled or crushing each other. And also to ensure that panic did not break out. At the time, we didn’t think that we could be giving the Serbs a means with which they could pick out the men more easily. (…) There was no other option, really. If you see people nearly crushing each other to death, you have to take action.”(PE hearings, p. 32).
No, it didn’t make it easier. Granted, it accelerates the process, but they could have just as easily let the mixed group of refugees board the buses and then pick out the men. That does not have any effect at all. We just wanted to prevent a wave of refugees from panicking and running to the buses and that the Serbs would respond to that, possibly even with force. For that reason we wanted to channel the crowd.”(PE hearings, p. 76).
The women and children who I had prioritised arrived unharmed. So there was no reason to stop the evacuation at that point. It was the only solution at the time, because I could not take care of them. (…) We expressly and clearly chose to help the large number of women and children. If I had stopped the evacuation, Mladić would not have had to worry at all, because the problem would have solved itself within a matter of days. That sounds very cynical, but it would have created a situation with many casualties without direct influence from Mladić (…) I started to have suspicions than it was more grim for the men than I initially thought. All in all, I decided, or rather advised, to continue the evacuation and not stop it. That means that you make a conscious decision: I chose 25,000 women and children at the possible expense of 600 to 700 men – it was also unclear to us that all those men would be killed.”(PE hearings, p. 76).
That is correct, sir. I had those fears”.
He (Ibro Nuhanović – Appeals Court) asked me to stop the evacuation, because he feared everybody would be killed by the Serbs. I answered that I feared, in fact, for the men as well but that, in fact, he asked me to make the choice between thousands of women and children and the men. And then he answered that he understood what I meant, and he agreed and went away”.
mini safe areaoutside the compound and admit them to the compound. Dutchbat did not have a viable alternative under the given circumstances to bring the refugees to safety and to take them out of the quickly deteriorating situation in the mini safe area. Furthermore, it is not proven – and Claimants do not argue this – that the other refugees who were being evacuated and taken to Kaldanj as agreed ran the risk of being killed or inhumanely treated. Continuing the evacuation was in fact in the interest of this large group of other refugees, who had been brought to safety and taken out of the miserable conditions of the
mini safe area. In this regard the District Court takes into consideration that as a result of this situation in the
mini safe areaseveral people had already been killed and that on July 11th 1995 the assessment was made that the refugees – depending on the circumstances – could stay in the
mini safe areafor another three to five days. So on July 12th 1995 another two to four days. It is the District Court’s opinion that, in the given circumstances and in view of what it knew at the time, Dutchbat was able to take a reasonable decision to continue the evacuation, which brought the majority of the refugees to safety and out of a situation that was becoming increasingly untenable. The District Court therefore does not accept Claimants’ argument that an unjustifiable assessment.
The only way to prevent the separation of the men was to stop the evacuation, about which I already made a statement.”
,after the decision had been made not to stop the evacuation, in its actions during the evacuation Dutchbat had to make an assessment about on the one hand the safety of the able-bodied men who were at risk of being removed from the queues by the Bosnian Serbs on their way to the buses, and on the other hand the safety of the other refugees. In view of the experiences of the day before, at the chaotic start of the evacuation when there was a large
runon the buses and people were being trampled and buses became overcrowded, Dutchbat in all reasonableness was able to decide to continue to assist the evacuation by forming a lock through which groups of refugees walked in turns to the buses. The District Court also takes into account that the alternative of not assisting by means of taking up a position as observer as suggested by Rutten would not have stopped the Bosnian Serbs from pulling men out of the rows of refugees. It has not been asserted, nor is there any evidence that there was any alternative other than to stop the evacuation as mentioned by Franken. It has previously been assessed that Dutchbat was able to decide in all reasonableness to continue the evacuation, in view of the interests of the other refugees being served.
“Together they separated the men from the women. I was also separated from my husband. I never saw him again.”
ca, they were stopped and further screening was carried out for men who had managed to escape the net at Potočari.”(Krstić, legal ground no. 368) and:
The strength of the desire to capture all the Bosnian Muslim men was so great that the Bosnian Serb forces systematically stopped the buses transporting the women, children and elderly at Tiš
ca and checked that no men were hiding on board. Those men found in the buses were removed and subsequently executed.”(Krstić, legal ground no. 547).
mini safe areataken prisoner by the Bosnian Serbs were killed.
I explained to you before why I did not physically protect the men. This does not mean that I regard the drawing up of a list as being equivalent to the physical protection of the men. But in the given situation, it was one of the possibilities to at least offer them some protection.”(PE hearings, p. 77).
mini safe area. Dutchbat was fully in control of the enclosed compound. The Bosnian Serbs who were present in the
mini safe areaoutside the compound and did not shy away from committing war crimes there, never interfered with the compound and respected Dutchbat’s authority over the compound. As has been assessed above, the State had jurisdiction in the compound, as stipulated in Article 1 ECHR and Article 1 ICCPR, in contrast with the part of the
mini safe areathat lay outside the compound.
mini safe area. This puts the argument of the State in perspective regarding the minor number of Dutchbat soldiers in the
mini safe areain relation to the number of refugees. In addition, Dutchbat had an overall insight into the number of able-bodied men within the compound, of whom the majority were on the list Franken had had drawn up, and did not have insight into the number of men among the refugees in the part of the
mini safe areaoutside the compound.
serious risk) of genocide if the men residing at the compound were to be carried off by the Bosnian Serbs.
mini safe areaoutside the compound, which would have entailed Dutchbat picking men out of the crown of refugees.
mini safe areaoutside the compound. In all reasonableness, Dutchbat could have been required to reassess the situation and all interests concerned prior to the evacuation of the refugees from the compound and that it should have decided to let the male refugees stay at the compound.
to take all reasonable measures to protect refugees and civilians in your care”, Dutchbat should have terminated its cooperation with the evacuation from that moment, in any case with regard to the able-bodied men, according to the Appeals Court. As is apparent from the foregoing, it is the opinion of the District Court that this applies from the moment the evacuation of refugees from the compound started, in which the necessity to terminate its cooperation became all the more pressing as, other than on July 12th 1995 and in the morning of July 13th 1995, Dutchbat must have been aware of a
serious riskof the male refugees being killed in a genocide.
“a concerted effort (...) to capture all Muslim men of military age”and was
“the operation to capture and detain the Bosnian men (…) well organized and comprehensive”(Krstić, legal ground no. 85).
The District Court takes into account the fact that the Bosnian Serbs up to that moment had not interfered with the compound and that their earlier threats to use force against the compound had proven to be empty. It was already clear to Franken when the enclave fell that Mladić would not allow UN soldiers to be killed (NIOD, p. 2241) and on July 12th 1995, Voorhoeve had already concluded that sparing peacekeeping forces was part of the Bosnian Serbs’ attack strategy (NIOD, p. 2439). It is also taken into account that the Bosnian Serbs must have been aware of the presence of an orderly number of able-bodied men at the compound, contrary to the rest of the
mini safe area: during the Dutch parliamentary committee of inquiry, Franken stated that he had let two or three Bosnian Serbs onto the compound shortly after the fall of the enclave
“because they wanted to make sure that the entire 28th division was not there with me at the compound”(PE hearings, p. 74). Finally, the Bosnian Serbs had found out on July 11th 1995 that the UN and NATO were willing to deploy air weapons and the District Court considers it impossible that no air support would have been provided if the compound had been attacked.
blocking positions
brotherMuhamed is not a reason to expand the identified circle of persons towards whom the State is liable. Nuhanović had a special position as a UN interpreter who was supposed to be evacuated along with Dutchbat. He made efforts to convince Dutchbat to let his brother remain at the compound and did not succeed in discouraging Dutchbat from sending his brother Muhamed away from the compound after the other refugees (maybe with the exception of the Mustafić family) had left the compound. This actual situation, in which the special position of Nuhanović plays a role, would not have occurred if Dutchbat – as the District Courts finds it should have done – had decided to let the group of able-bodied men stay at the compound at the
startof the evacuation of the refugees from the compound in the late afternoon of July 13th.
mini safe areathat lay outside the compound. The claims of [Claimant 1] et al. are therefore dismissed.
Stichtingrepresents their interests, the State is liable towards the family members referred to under 4.339 of the men who in the late afternoon of July 13th 1995 were deported from the compound and subsequently killed by the Bosnian Serbs. Further possibly relevant questions fall outside the scope of these proceedings and therefore remain undiscussed.
Stichting, resulting from the cooperation extended by Dutchbat to the deportation of the male refugees who in the late afternoon of July 13th 1995 were deported from the compound in Potočari by the Bosnian Serbs and subsequently killed.
5.The decision
Stichting, resulting from the cooperation extended by Dutchbat to the deportation of the male refugees who in the late afternoon of July 13th 1995 were deported from the compound in Potočari by the Bosnian Serbs and subsequently killed