Over de vraag of een beperking van het recht op vrijheid van vreedzame vergadering in een democratische samenleving noodzakelijk is, heeft het EHRM in diezelfde uitspraak het volgende overwogen:
“142. The right to freedom of assembly, one of the foundations of a democratic society, is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established. When examining whether restrictions on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention can be considered “necessary in a democratic society” the Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation (see Barraco, cited above, § 42). It is, in any event, for the Court to give a final ruling on the restriction’s compatibility with the Convention and this is to be done by assessing the circumstances of a particular case (see Osmani and Others v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 50841/99, ECHR 2001-X, and Galstyan, cited above, § 114).
143. When the Court carries out its scrutiny, its task is not to substitute its own view for that of the relevant national authorities but rather to review under Article 11 the decisions they took. This does not mean that it has to confine itself to ascertaining whether the State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; it must look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine, having established that it pursued a “legitimate aim”, whether it answered a “pressing social need” and, in particular, whether it was proportionate to that aim and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it were “relevant and sufficient” (see Coster v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24876/94, § 104, 18 January 2001; Ashughyan v. Armenia, no. 33268/03, § 89, 17 July 2008; S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, § 101, ECHR 2008; Barraco, cited above, § 42; and Kasparov and Others, cited above, § 86). In so doing, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 11 and, moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts (see Rai and Evans, cited above, and Gün and Others, cited above, § 75; see also United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, 30 January 1998, § 47, Reports 1998-I, and Gerger v. Turkey [GC], no. 24919/94, § 46, 8 July 1999).
144. The proportionality principle demands that a balance be struck between the requirements of the purposes listed in paragraph 2 on the one hand, and those of the free expression of opinions by word, gesture or even silence by persons assembled on the streets or in other public places, on the other (see Osmani and Others, cited above; Skiba, cited above; Fáber, cited above, § 41; and Taranenko, cited above, § 65).
145. Freedom of assembly as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention protects a demonstration that may annoy or cause offence to persons opposed to the ideas or claims that it is seeking to promote (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden, cited above, § 86). Any measures interfering with freedom of assembly and expression other than in cases of incitement to violence or rejection of democratic principles – however shocking and unacceptable certain views or words used may appear to the authorities – do a disservice to democracy and often even endanger it (see Güneri and Others v. Turkey, nos. 42853/98 and 2 others, § 76, 12 July 2005; Sergey Kuznetsov, cited above, § 45; Alekseyev, cited above, § 80; Fáber, cited above, § 37; Gün and Others, cited above, § 70; and Taranenko, cited above, § 67).
146. The nature and severity of the penalties imposed are also factors to be taken into account when assessing the proportionality of an interference in relation to the aim pursued (see Öztürk v. Turkey [GC], no. 22479/93, § 70, ECHR 1999-VI; Osmani and Others, cited above; and Gün and Others, cited above, § 82). Where the sanctions imposed on the demonstrators are criminal in nature, they require particular justification (see Rai and Evans, cited above). A peaceful demonstration should not, in principle, be rendered subject to the threat of a criminal sanction (see Akgöl and Göl v. Turkey, nos. 28495/06 and 28516/06, § 43, 17 May 2011), and notably to deprivation of liberty (see Gün and Others, cited above, § 83). Thus, the Court must examine with particular scrutiny the cases where sanctions imposed by the national authorities for non-violent conduct involve a prison sentence (see Taranenko, cited above, § 87).
(...)
149. (...) the freedom to take part in a peaceful assembly is of such importance that a person cannot be subject to a sanction – even one at the lower end of the scale of disciplinary penalties – for participation in a demonstration which has not been prohibited, so long as that person does not himself commit any reprehensible act on such an occasion (see Ezelin, cited above, § 53; Galstyan, cited above, § 115; and Barraco, cited above, § 44). This is true also when the demonstration results in damage or other disorder (see Taranenko, cited above, § 88).”